As I write this, the Iraqi elections are but a few days away. Though we can hope and pray that this event will help deal a deathblow to the insurgent movement, in all likelihood the violence will continue unabated even after the election. The Bush Administration's social engineering designs on the Middle East have clearly gone awry. Yet, though we can question the wisdom of the neo-conservatives' agenda on Iraq, one thing remains painfully clear: We cannot, under any circumstances, evacuate Iraq until we have suppressed the current uprising.

Opponents of the U.S. occupation have gone out of their way to portray the insurgents as noble patriots fighting for the freedom of Iraq. American presence alone drives these men and women to kill thousands of civilians, saw off the heads of kidnapped foreigners and demolish critical infrastructure. There are those who believe that if the U.S. pulls out of the country, these "Arab minutemen" will presumably lay down their arms and retire to their homes. Not surprisingly, this thesis suffers from a number of gross misconceptions.

The insurgents battling the government in Baghdad and the United States do not fight for an independent Iraq. The phrase "Iraqi Nationalist" is an oxymoron for the simple reason that an Iraqi nation has never existed. Iraq is a state created following the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Very few of its inhabitants think of themselves as Iraqi but rather as Shi'ite, Kurdish or Sunni Arab. It is from this final category that the vast majority of insurgents come. From the 1630s to the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Sunni Arab minority lorded over the Shi'ias and Kurds. Sunni Arabs dominated the military and government while generally receiving superior education and salaries. Think apartheid South Africa: not quite as stratified as Iraq, but still a textbook study of minority rule. The insurgents' motivation derives from their desperate desire to restore the old order of Sunni ascendancy. Democracy in Iraq, which would obviously guarantee Shi'ite control of the central government, is an unacceptable solution, regardless of the presence of U.S. troops. If anything, the American military ensures that Iraq does not slide any further into chaos.

Some have called for United Nations peacekeepers to replace the U.S. army, arguing that the presence of blue helmets will help bring calm to the Sunni Arab community. However, unless the UN goes about restoring the old order, the insurgents will also perceive it as an enemy. Looking over the UN's appalling record of ineptness in Somalia, Rwanda and recently in Congo, sending peacekeepers into the hornets' nest of the Sunni Triangle would invite disaster.

If the U.S. pulls out prior to quelling the current uprising, large tracts of Iraqi territory would undoubtedly fall permanently into the hands of the insurgents. From this base, the Sunni Arab reactionaries could make a drive to topple the weak central government in Baghdad. Imagine the butchery that would occur if Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi's henchmen penetrated the Shi'ite slums of Sadr City. The Shi'ite leadership would become markedly more radical if faced with a serious challenge from their former oppressors. If hard-pressed, the Shi'ite population might make an appeal to neighboring Iran for assistance. Iranian intervention could in turn spark a region-wide war, pitting Shi'ites against Sunnis. Even if foreign powers refrain from entering Iraq, the level of bloodshed would be appalling, with communal violence reaching levels unknown in Eurasia since the partition of India. Anarchy in Iraq assures rocketing oil prices and subsequently horrific damage to the global economy, dragging hundred of thousands, if not millions, into great poverty.

We can continue to challenge the Defense Department's handling of the insurgency. Washington's clumsy attempt to win the hearts and minds of Sunni Arabs has clearly failed. This shortcoming should not cause us to sink into a state of despair. Contrary to popular myth, insurgencies can be quickly stamped out of existence. The fate of the FMLN in El Salvador, the Montoneros in Argentina, the Tupamaros in Uruguay and the Simbas in Congo demonstrate that insurrectionists can suffer a decisive defeat. Numerous options exist. However, an immediate withdrawal is not one of them. The departure of American soldiers cannot occur until the U.S. military, assisted by our allies, snuffs out the dream of restoring minority rule in Iraq. The United States must make it clear to the Sunni Arab population that continued resistance to the new order places them on collision course with catastrophe. Only then can our troops come home.

Baca can be reached at mwbaca@amherst.edu