Let's first dispense with insufficient justifications for limiting immigration. Ms. Maleck dutifully sights the conservative standby fear: homeland security. Red herring, anyone? She claims with liberalization, "drug trafficking becomes harder to regulate, as does the admission of terrorists." This is senseless: How could an increase in the number of legal immigrants impede our ability to regulate illegal traffic? It seems likely that with fewer illegal immigrants (some will pursue legal channels), border patrols will be less burdened and more effective.
Additionally, while American workers seem content to benefit from foreign capital investment, there exists a strong public distaste for foreign labor. To the extent that this sentiment is merely nationalism, xenophobia, cultural prejudice and racism, it has no place in informed policy. However, this sentiment may reflect fears that immigration will have harmful economic consequences: decreased wages and unemployment.
The first claim, that immigration lowers wages significantly by increasing labor supply, is neither theoretically nor empirically supported. The late Tadeusz Rybczynski's theorem suggests that regions can accommodate increases in labor supply by increasing production of labor intensive goods rather than lowering wages. Recent National Bureau of Econmic Research work by Gordon Hanson and Mattew Slaughter finds that U.S. regional labor changes are most often not addressed with wage changes. A study published by the Cato Institute finds, "Immigration has no discernible effect on wages overall. ... Wage growth and decline appear to be unrelated to immigration-a finding that holds for both unskilled and skilled workers." Such evidence is plentiful and the conclusion clear, that empirical data overwhelmingly disputes significant wage decreases from immigration.
The second concern, that immigration would significantly increase unemployment, is equally flawed. Ms. Maleck holds the mistaken notion that the number of jobs is constant, and that any job taken by an immigrant is lost by a native. Harvard University economist George Borjas writes, "There is no empirical evidence documenting that the displacement effect [of natives from jobs] is numerically important." The Cato Institute study explains, "The jobs [immigrants] create with their purchasing power, and with the new businesses which they start, are at least as numerous as the jobs which immigrants fill." Immigrant job creation is the fatal error of any zero-sum appraisal.
Why limit immigration at all? Immigration should be denied if an applicant's admittance would decrease the country's total welfare: if unemployable, near retirement, likely to require medical attention or a criminal. Optimal policy would admit those who offer welfare gains and deny entry to "free riders."
Economist Gary Becker suggests a fee for entry. An appropriate fee would discourage those hoping for a free ride; the fee would be paid by individuals who expect to work and benefit from higher wages. What's more, immigrants would be younger-and consequently less of a burden on social programs-because the young benefit from higher wages over a longer period. Entrance fees could be financed by loans similar to other human capital investments. Such a fee system would both select productive applicants and generate additional revenues.
Alternatively, objective screening could be used. Considering age, health, education, criminal record, English proficiency, etc., each applicants' productivity is determined; applicants likely to produce above their burden are admitted without fee. Richard Posner suggests denied applicants be admitted for their expected monetary burden. Screening achieves the desired sorting: Individuals likely to be productive would be admitted without barriers, and those who may not be would have to bear their burden, encouraging productivity should they immigrate.
Either policy could be augmented by some suspension of benefits. While emergency medical care could not ethically be denied, denying access to entitlement programs for some period after entry would dissuade free riders. Immigrants entering under a fee will have paid their burden, and those selected will not be ill. Immigrants willing to take their chances without these government safety nets would most likely be productive citizens.
Both reforms are admittedly conceptual; however, either policy would be superior to our current system, because both address specific pitfalls of liberalized immigration while capturing the plethora of benefits. Ms. Maleck's critique offers no answers, scoffs at both theory and evidence from indisputably intelligent scholars while presenting neither, and at times rings with disdain for academic analysis of policy. Opportunities are immense if we choose to craft immigration policy thoughtfully with the goal of national welfare, but to do so we must abandon xenophobic ignorance and examine the actual evidence of immigration's effects.
McClellan can be reached at chmcclellan@amherst.edu