With a massive deficit, a looming Social Security/Medicare crisis and a population that appears increasingly unwilling to successfully prosecute the critical war in Iraq, America seems poised to decline. It is quite possible that in the next decades, the U.S. will drastically scale back its commitments overseas to focus on its own troubles. Yet, rather than paving the way for a brighter future, the demise of the American Empire would be catastrophic for the world.
For all its flaws, the world has never witnessed such a degree of prosperity and peace as it does now under American dominance. The "War on Terror" notwithstanding, the number of armed conflicts and terrorist attacks has consistently gone down since the mid-1980s, around the same time America's last peer competitor, the Soviet Union, started to collapse. Washington has employed its considerable hard and soft power to prevent the outbreak or escalation of numerous conflicts. The Indo-Pakistani Crisis of 2002 perfectly illustrates the importance of America as the world's peacekeeper. When both Islamabad and New Delhi rattled their nuclear sabers and were unwilling to back down, the US intervened, using its prestige and diplomatic leverage to convince both parties to pull back from the brink. No other power could have prevented a nuclear holocaust in South Asia.
The American Empire carries the international order on its shoulders. Its downfall would leave a massive vacuum in its wake. This vacuum might not present such a problem if there existed another power waiting in the wings to assume America's position as the premier world power. The two polities most often seen as potential successors, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the European Union (EU), are not viable in the least.
On the surface, the PRC appears primed to become a major power in the 21st century. Its huge, orderly population, coupled with a blistering hot economy, has convinced many to anoint China as a superpower in the making. Yet, for all the hype, China suffers several serious flaws that could derail it in the near future.
Beijing's quest for modernization has come at a cost. Beyond the glistening new skyscrapers of Shanghai and Guangzhou lies a land undergoing traumatic change. Irresponsible agricultural policies and industrialization have caused much of China's once fertile farmlands to deteriorate at an alarming rate, becoming vast stretches of arid wastelands. Economic reconfigurations have caused unemployment levels that top 20 percent, creating armies of vagrant workers who wander from town to town in search of work.
So far, China's ostensibly remarkable economic growth rates have permitted the rulers of Beijing to placate the masses. However, the good times cannot last forever. Corruption permeates every level of government while the Chinese banking system is, at best, fragile. An even more calamitous event would be the total collapse of the U.S. dollar. With its prosperity so closely tied to the ravenous appetites of American consumers, China would overnight enter into tailspin.
It has become fashionable for students of international relations to describe the PRC as the Germany of the 21st century: an emerging economic and military power eager to gain its "place in the sun." Actually, China more closely resembles Russia during the final decades of the Romanov dynasty, a rapidly industrializing giant that looked impressive on paper but, in reality, suffered from such social and regional upheavals that the first major shock caused the whole state to collapse like a house of cards.
Then there's Europe. Most observers, aside from a handful of ardent Europhiles, had already realized that the European Union could not hope to transform itself into a superpower well before the French and Dutch rejections of the EU constitution this summer. The squabbling that occurred between the EU states in the months leading up to the Iraq War demonstrated the disunity of Europe's elites, especially in the realm of foreign policy. In any case, overcoming this barrier alone still will not solve Europe's woes.
Europe's main problem lies with its aging population. For example, the median age in France will jump from 28 to 45 by 2050. In order to avoid a serious fiscal crisis, EU members would have to dramatically cut government transfers or exact crippling tax burdens on the upcoming generation. With such a grim economic forecast, it's hard to imagine where the elites of Europe could dig up the funds necessary to upgrade their increasingly obsolete armed forces.
Some analysts argue that the absence of a "hyperpower" would benefit the world. They believe a multi-polar globe provides a more conducive environment for international cooperation. This rosy vision of the future assumes that a retreat of U.S. power in any region will simply lead to a peaceful reconfiguration of that area's power structure. Sounds straight forward enough, but is it realistic?
Say the US determines that it can no longer maintain its domination of East Asia and proceeds to scale back its military commitments. Undoubtedly, China would try to resume its traditional role as the "Middle Kingdom" and begin strong-arming its neighbors. It's highly unlikely that Taiwan and Japan would accept Chinese imperialism. No longer protected by America's defense umbrella, both states would swiftly develop their own nuclear arsenals. What's more, resource-poor Japan, which has for so long depended on the U.S. navy to keep the vital sea lanes open, would have no choice but to enlarge its own fleet. These developments could in turn ignite a dangerous arms race in the region, creating a tense atmosphere not unlike the one found in Europe on the eve of World War I.
Hopefully the American Empire can overcome the challenges it presently faces and continue to uphold the existing global order. If it fails, we will find ourselves in a chaotic world where states vie with one another for power, resources and arms, both conventional and nuclear. In such a grim setting, life expectancies and trade would shrivel up. In short, a new Dark Age would set in. The Kumbaya crowd should keep this in mind.
Baca can be reached at mwbaca@amherst.edu