For the past few months, North Korean representatives have been meeting with those from the United States, China, Russia, South Korea and Japan in an attempt to resolve the conflicts that have arisen as a result of North Korea's possession of nuclear capabilities. By requiring the presence of these other countries and by refusing to engage in bilateral talks, the U.S. has recognized the importance of this issue for North Korea's neighbors.
In early 1994, North Korea agreed to forego its nuclear program in exchange for energy aid from the U.S. However, this agreement became null in 2002 when the U.S. discovered that North Korea had gone ahead with the development of a secret nuclear weapons program that was in direct violation of their previous agreement. This blatant disregard for such an important international agreement leads one to think that North Korea never had any intention of adhering to it in the first place. It also leads one to question whether North Korea will be faithful this time, or if the country will continue to pursue its previous aggressive and dangerous course.
North Korea's lucrative uranium mines, which maintain four million tons of exploitable high-quality uranium, have made it possible for the development of nuclear weapons. This atomic production has led to an international breach of trust which only recently has been addressed.
A series of six-party talks ensued in which China lived up to its role as an Eastern super-power by playing a large role as negotiator. These conversations finally culminated in results earlier this month: On Sept. 9, North Korea signed a treaty agreeing to give up all of its nuclear capabilities and rejoin the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. This acquiescence came after much hesitation on North Korea's part, as well as transparent attempts to maintain some parts of its nuclear program.
The September agreement was signed only with the other countries' recognition of North Korea's desire to retain its civilian nuclear program, as well as its wish for a light-water reactor. These demands do not illustrate a commitment to the cessation of nuclear proliferation. Rather, this hesitation and reluctance to commit alludes to a much larger problem: North Korea's obvious lack of desire to cease its nuclear weapons production, for numerous problematic reasons.
To justify its production of nuclear weaponry, North Korea has cited its need for protection against the potential aggressive action of South Korea, Japan and the United States. However, this statement has long ceased to be a valid reason since all of these countries have made it clear that they have no desire for anything except benign relations with North Korea. The United States was especially adamant on this point during the September discussions. The only reason North Korea could possibly want nuclear capabilities is as a negotiating tool. Since the country is facing no real outside threat, it stands to reason that this negotiating tool would manifest itself in some form of aggressive action.
When its argument for a nuclear weapons program failed, North Korea tried a different angle: energy production. The hunger crisis that exists is a very real concern; nearly 6.5 million people are in need of food aid, according to the World Food Program. This situation has all of the markings of the 1990s tragedy in which over one million North Koreans died from starvation. North Korea has used this as an argument for retention of the "civilian aspect" of its nuclear program, claiming nuclear power will help assuage the problem. While the food crisis is a legitimate issue, a nuclear program is not the solution. A country with nuclear capabilities on the Korean peninsula, in such close relation to China and Japan, could prove disastrous. When nuclear weapons are involved, countries tend to get nervous and even the most mundane negotiations become over-shadowed with the threat of nuclear capability. The existence of this threat would only make North Korea's neighbors less willing to provide humanitarian aid.
The treaty that was finally signed in September should go a long way in cementing U.S.–North Korean relations. However, all of the disagreements along the way do not bode well for a permanent international accord.
While this resolution marks a step forward in the quest for peace between nations and general nuclear disarmament, it is by no means a guarantee that North Korea's nuclear program will stop. Their frequent demands for concessions along the way indicate an unwillingness for complete disarmament.
What has happened once can happen again, and it would be wise of all nations to keep an eye on North Korea and the very real possibility of another emergence of nuclear production.
Ball can be reached at jball09@amherst.edu