In his article, Corrales presents the Chávez administration as politically authoritarian and economically incompetent. He writes of how Hugo Chávez "engineered a new constitution that did away with the Senate." Yet Corrales neglects to note that a democratically elected Constitutional Assembly drafted the constitution, which was then approved by 71 percent of the population-a political thunderclap. Political analyst Eva Golinger concurs, referring to the document as "one of the most progressive constitutions in the world in the area of human rights." But Corrales demurs, referring to Chávez as a "competitive autocrat."
Corrales also writes that this was "one of the most anti-party constitutions" in Latin America. He omits the historical context. The policies of the Patriotic Pole-the Chavista coalition-and its anti-democratic atavism can be overwhelmingly attributed to 40 years of corruption and collusion on the part of the two theretofore regnant parties, Corporación Organizada Para Estafar Inocentes (COPEI) and Acción Democrática (AD) and their unwillingness to do anything for Venezuela's desperate poor. The population blamed these two parties "for establishing a pattern of exclusion" that kept the Venezuelan poor-80 percent of the population-and even the left wing of AD out of the decision making process, as Steve Ellner, a leading expert on Venezuelan politics and history, notes.
Corrales also hints at Chavista voter fraud, writing of how the opposition was "shocked not so much by the results as by the ease with which international observers condoned" the electoral audit. Observers did not simply facilely approve the audit; the Carter Center, hardly a radical outfit, appointed an independent statistician to re-examine the results. The conclusion, as put forth by Jennifer McCoy, an elections observer, in The Economist, was that "the vote itself was secret and free." The conservative Organization of American States agreed, issuing a post-referendum press release stating, "citizens participating in the referendum did so freely, without hindrance or restrictions on the expression of their will." In contradistinction to Corrales's conclusions, the opposition, "Surrounded by family and neighbors, cut off from the poor sections of town" were stunned by the results, confusing "'their' reality with 'the' reality; 'their' country with 'the' country," as Venezuelan political scientist Margarita López-Maya described elite perceptions of the 2004 referendum results.
Corrales then turns to Chávez's mismanagement of the Venezuelan economy. Chávez and his administration, Corrales writes, have done little for the Venezuelan people, having "failed to improve any meaningful measure of poverty, education or equality." Yet the Chávez government's promotion of "educational reform which schooled over one million children for the first time and doubled investment in education," as Greg Wilpert, a former Fulbright scholar in Venezuela, writes, has increased the percentage of children in school from 83 to 90 percent. Poverty, too, has declined: The most recent statistics show that the percentage of people living in extreme poverty-families that lack the means to feed their children-has decreased by 40 percent, in the midst of an opposition-engineered oil strike and the shattering effects of massive capital flight. Estimates also suggest that 40 percent of the population shops at government-subsidized food markets. Corrales calls this giving "[Chavez's] supporters" a raft of "unimaginable favors." I do not know what Corrales means by unimaginable, but surely the starving poor of Caracas can imagine feeding their malnourished children.
Corrales also dislikes the public health measures of the Movement of the Fifth Republic. He aspersively refers to Chávez's "ad hoc Cuban clinics" as an exemplar of his Potemkin policies, incapable of effecting "meaningful" change. Yet the Barrio Adentro project, in which over 10,000 Cuban doctors tend to Venezuela's immiserated poor, has enabled "more than 60 percent of Venezuelans" to receive free healthcare, saving thousands of lives, reports Washington think tank Council on Hemispheric Affairs. Life expectancy has concomitantly increased, and infant mortality has dropped by nearly 20 percent. Again, I do not know what Corrales means by meaningful, but I do imagine that Venezuelan mothers cry when their babies die.
Finally, Corrales writes, Chávez, following a well-trod authoritarian path, has raised "society's tolerance for state intervention." Chávez has failed to adhere to neoliberal economic policies, namely by not "addressing the economy's lack of competitiveness," by failing to "kill inflation," and by failing to promote "stable property rights." Instead, Chávez has charted a course sharply tangent to Corrales's orthodoxy, offering "subsidies and protection to economic agents in trouble," daring to set "price controls and [creating] local grocery stores with subsidized prices," and, finally, expanding "state employment." Yet, with all this, the economy grew by 9.4 percent in 2005, led by the non-oil sector, the fastest growth in Latin America, and Chávez's approval rating remains almost unimaginably high-the latest polls place it at close to 75 percent.
Corrales is right to posit a relationship between economics and democracy. But he is wrong to prescribe the neoliberal economic policies that are "responsible for the spread of global austerity," as Robert Pollin, an economist at UMass, writes. Pollin continues, noting that "the world has experienced increasing disparities between the very rich and the very poor" during the "the neoliberal era." In particular, South America was a testing ground for the neoliberal experiment: Argentina followed precisely the policies prescribed by Corrales for Venezuela. Resultantly, "unemployment and inequality began rising sharply almost immediately after the plan was implemented, and the country began sinking into depression by 1997," as Pollin concludes. Yet, Corrales would offer this toxic elixir to Venezuela, although it is clear that Bolivarian economic policies are redistributing the country's wealth in a more egalitarian manner than ever before, while simultaneously catalyzing robust growth.
Corrales may not like the kind of democracy emerging in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. But it is an awesome mistake to mistake this democracy for something else.
Ajl can be reached at msajl@amherst.edu