The logic is quite simple: If child pornography expressed in image is illegal, then so is child pornography expressed in text.
Other than Prosecutor Mary Beth Buchanan, who is often referred to as "the government's most aggressive opponent of pornography," Fletcher's most formidable foe is the community standard. Fletcher insists that her work is not damaging to the community. According to Fletcher, Red Rose is her way of dealing with the memories of sexual abuse in her own childhood, and perhaps is a help to other victims of similar backgrounds (The New York Times, "A Prosecution Tests The Definition of Obscenity," Sept. 28, 2007).
At this point one may quickly conclude that Fletcher's writings are justified not only by the Constitution, but by the productive intentions behind her work-she is, after all, only trying to deal with a painful past and writing is her way of coping. That latter explanation holds no water, however. The contention is not whether she should be allowed to write, but whether her writing should be made public.
Fletcher's fiction is surely pornography. It displays child sexuality in a gratuitous, hedonistic form, but this conclusion only leads to an oft-disputed question: Could the stories of Red Rose possibly possess redemptive qualities? Do they contribute some aesthetic innovation to the world of art? Because if they do, by all means, the courts may allow Fletcher to continue her questionable enterprise. After all, novels such as "A Clockwork Orange" and poems such as "Howl" are considered to be some of the most socially enduring masterpieces of all time. But Fletcher's fiction must not be raised to the admired level of these other works-her "literature" contains, instead of social commentary, a montage of images both perverse and purposeless. Even the American media, not known for its strict sense of morality, will not tolerate it. It involves children, after all.
One may argue that since Fletcher's fiction does not cause any kind of harm to minors, her fiction is harmless. One must remember, however, that child pornography is not banned in the United States simply because it exploits minors physically and mentally. According to our laws, child pornography is detrimental to society as a whole-to those who view it, and those who are aware of it. Children may not be affected, but everyone else will be-this is an ethical notion that most Americans would be aware of.
Fletcher's lawyers have defended her case that textual pornography does not violate community standards. This proposition is insubstantial, and the Federal District Court seems to think so too. In 2005, Judge Joy F. Conti ruled in favor of Prosecutor Buchanan, so there is no chance that the benignity-of-text argument will be of any use in the appellate courts.
The adage that a picture is worth a thousand words does not apply to the potential sex offender. The journals kept by countless child predators are full of words that are infinite in their perversity. Unlike a photograph or a moving image, words enable the mind to form its own images that are idiosyncratic to the reader, a far more dangerous effect when it comes to something as socially risky as pornography. A text is just as, if not more, potent as a visual. Fletcher's work must be dealt with the same way an X-rated video would be in a court of law.
Pornography will always be with us-and it will always be easily accessible to minors. Yet even the smallest improvements can be made to keep our children safe. A more solid, unambiguous obscenity law must rule our nation's courts, so that cases such as these can be decided with finality; furthermore, policies must be implemented to make pornography much more difficult to be obtained by young children. Lastly, Fletcher's Web site, which possesses no artistic merit whatsoever, cannot be allowed to exist in its present form in the name of free speech. A solid justification for her work will not be found. When Fletcher loses this case in the appellate courts, it will be a small but sizeable proof that our judicial system knows what it means to distinguish between the socially beneficial and the clearly detrimental.