What is unique about Annapolis, however, is the relative weakness of all primary parties involved. Neither Israel’s Prime Minister Ehud Olmert nor Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is politically strong. Of the two, Abbas is undoubtedly the weaker. After Hamas’ violent takeover of Gaza this summer, Abbas dissolved the Palestinian Legislative Council and appointed an emergency government under the moderate economist Salaam Fayyad. In doing so, however, Abbas acted under dubious constitutional authority and the Fayyad government consequently has suffered from an aura of political illegitimacy. Abbas has staked his power on his putative ability to gain concessions from Israel and improve the lot of his West Bank constituents through compromise and negotiation, rather than through the violent tactics of his Hamas rivals. Failure at Annapolis would significantly undercut this foundation of his authority.
It is profoundly in Israel’s interest to bolster the reputation and legitimacy of Abbas and Fayyad. Therefore, Ehud Olmert needs to ensure that the Palestinians can call this conference successful. His own political position, though, is tenuous, and has been so since the inconclusive Lebanon War of 2006. According to a recent Dahaf Research Institute poll, Olmert has a 41 percent approval rating and trails right-wing candidate Benjamin Netanyahu 31 percent to 11 percent in a putative prime ministerial contest. Additionally, his conservative coalition partners in Yisrael Beiteinu and Shas have promised to bolt the government and force elections if Olmert is overly generous. With the strength of the challenge from the Right and Olmert’s security failures, he may be unwilling to “risk the government for something unclear,” as one of his officials told The New York Times.
Despite his perilous political situation, Olmert still holds all the meaningful cards at Annapolis, and it is imperative that he use them to engage the moderate Palestinians rather than antagonize them through stalling. Israeli troops still man checkpoints all over the West Bank, settlements continue to expand and Israel continues to hold Palestinian prisoners in her jails. Conciliatory action on any—and preferably all—of these fronts would be an encouraging first step that would strengthen Abbas’ stature in the Palestinian territories and remind his constituents that moderation leads to success at the bargaining table. Furthermore, taking steps to improve the standard of living in the West Bank and providing hope for future concessions will give the Palestinians more to lose, decreasing the appeal of Hamas and the other jihadist groups. Ideally, it will also strengthen moderates within Hamas itself by allowing them to pressure the group to relax its radicalism in order to stay relevant. In combination, these effects will create a climate of incentives for peace and strong disincentives to sink again into violence. The results will benefit civilians on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides. Israel needs to help the Palestinians in order to help itself.
Olmert, though, would be well advised to go even further. This conference represents a historic opportunity for a detailed baseline compromise on core issues like borders, refugees and Jerusalem. Arguably, the Oslo peace process failed because the two parties agreed to leave those most wrenching issues until final status talks, at which point Yasser Arafat was able to wriggle out of making a deal. This time, in Abbas, Olmert has a partner who actively demands an early understanding on key elements of an arrangement and he would be foolhardy not to accede in Annapolis. In general, Olmert should offer a final status peace based on the Barak offer at Camp David in 2000. Under that arrangement, Israel would give up 91 percent of the West Bank, dismantle most settlements, cede control of the Arab areas of East Jerusalem (though not the Old City), grant Palestinian custodianship over Temple Mount and compensate the Palestinians for lost territory in the West Bank with Israeli land in the Negev. In return, Olmert should insist that Palestinian refugees from 1948 be repatriated with monetary compensation to the state of Palestine rather than to Israel, and that the Palestinians specifically recognize Israel’s Jewish character. This bold step would be highly controversial, but it would put the onus on Abbas to accept or reject a reasonable compromise.
There is some hope that Olmert will be flexible at Annapolis. By simply agreeing to sit down at a comprehensive peace conference with multiple Arab states, he is abandoning a long-held Israeli preference for bilateral peace negotiations with individual Arab states. Olmert also comprehends clearly that Abbas and Fayyad are moderate partners with whom Israel can do business and that abandoning them at the summit will only strengthen extremists in the Palestinian territories. He realizes that moderate Arab countries have staked a great deal of prestige on the Annapolis summit, and that its failure plays into the hands of Iran. The question is whether his preoccupation with his own political survival will lead him to cast aside all of these geopolitical concerns. To do so and to sabotage the talks would be the height of idiocy and irresponsibility. If Olmert has to face Netanyahu before the Israeli people because of this summit, it would be far better for him to do so as a peacemaker than as a mere wily politician. If he wants to do that and is as interested in peace as he claims to be, Olmert will recognize that while peace requires sacrifices from both parties, the stronger party can better initiate the process. Therefore, the talks’ success is largely incumbent on Israel and on him.