With regard to Pakistan, we see this dilemma brought into clearer light. Under current President Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan has been a stable and faithful ally to the U.S. in its war on terror by coordinating captures of specific Al Qaeda members and providing support during the invasion of Afghanistan. Though Pakistan’s present government took power in a military coup, the U.S. has been, until lately, satisfied that a new age is dawning in Pakistan, with Musharraf leading the way towards a more democratic and free society. But, in recent months, that optimism has been stymied. Musharraf, in reaction to what he deemed outlandish rulings by the Supreme Court, dismissed the chief justice, a long-time political opponent of his. After liberal groups and lawyers protested vehemently, Musharraf initially backed down and reinstated the jurist. However, on Nov. 3, he declared emergency rule and gave himself the power to rule by decree. He began arresting political opponents and cracking down on protestors.
The U.S. government has watched this situation with a great degree of concern. The Bush administration worries that the toppling of Musharraf would bring about an Islamic militant coup, which could put one of the world’s largest nuclear arsenals under the control of Muslim radicals. This nuclear horror scenario has led many to propagate the view that the U.S. should continue supporting Musharraf with foreign aid and not risk a possible catastrophe. However, this attitude directly contradicts the current administration’s stated mission of spreading democracy. It would be highly hypocritical of the Bush White House to continue a war in Iraq based on spreading democracy while maintaining support for a dictator who has revoked basic freedoms in his country. Many Americans would cringe at such an open show of ideological duplicity. Others—who may disapprove of many of Bush’s policies—are willing to support non-intervention, believing that meddling in foreign countries to spread democracy is a bad idea.
The best way to resolve this present problem, however, can be found in the U.S.’s handling of Pakistan in the beginning. The fact remains that the U.S., through economic and diplomatic pressure, has been slowly changing Pakistan into a more democratic state. A recent example of this is the homecoming of Benazir Bhutto, the former prime minister and political foe of Musharraf. Bhutto returned to Pakistan on Oct. 18, and the two leaders brokered a deal, under U.S. pressure, to form a government in which they would share power. U.S. pressure has also been slowly alleviating the present situation. Musharraf, who many thought would not relinquish his power after attaining emergency rule, has announced that he will go through with the approaching planned elections. The president has also lifted the house arrest order on Bhutto, which Musharraf placed during the earlier stages of this chaos, and seems to be acquiescing to the idea that he must engage with the leftist factions of Pakistan, rather than oppressing them with arrests and detentions.
So the current U.S. foreign policy, at least in this situation, is on the right track. A continuing of this diplomatic and economic pressure will cause Musharraf to give in to further demands, and as long as the changes to democracy are made slowly and carefully, there is little threat of another military coup or an Islamic revolution. There is no good reason why the U.S. needs to compromise either its security interests or its ideological convictions. In this instance, at least, taking prudent steps to spread democracy should not be seen as an idiotic or misguided pursuit, but as a logical and just diplomatic route.
thing planned elections. The President has also lifted the house arrest order on his rival Bhutto, an order placed during the earlier stages of this chaos, and seems to be acquiescing to the idea that he must deal with the leftist factions of Pakistan, instead of oppressing them.
So the current U.S. foreign policy, at least in this situation, seems to be on the right track. A continuing of this diplomatic and economic pressure will cause Musharraf to give in to further demands, and as long as the changes to democracy are made slowly and carefully, there is little threat of another military coup or an Islamic revolution. Thus, in this instance at least, the attempted spread of democracy should not be seen as an idiotic pursuit, but as a logical and righteous diplomatic route.