With this statement the conference continued as planned, with Bush, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas addressing an international community of observers, including the Saudis and Syrians. The conference ended positively, with the leaders declaring that a final status agreement would be completed by 2008. Although the conference accomplished its set task, the criticism from both the Palestinian and Israeli factions has continued. This conference means nothing, the critics say, because this conflict is too complex, too emotional and most of all too rooted in the collective hopes and desires of these two nations to be soluble.
This skepticism merits some consideration. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has its roots in two antagonistic versions of national rights and history. The Palestinians claim that they, as the indigenous people of the land, deserve a state they were cruelly deprived of by British colonizers, invading Arab armies and Israeli occupation. The Palestinians demand a part of Jerusalem as their capital, the return of Palestinian refugees expelled during the 1948 war and the land in the West Bank and Gaza. Israeli sees itself in a different light and with a very different purpose—to protect the Jewish national state in the historic Jewish homeland, territory bought and developed by their early Zionist forefathers. Having fought and won several existential wars, the Israelis contend that their precarious security position justifies their demands—the cessation of attacks, the absorption of some major Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Arab recognition of Israel. Some believe that these differences are irreconcilable and that there is no point in trying to negotiate a settlement.
But, the view that the nature of these differences alone will prevent the Annapolis summit and its following negotiations to fail is mistaken. The history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a common theme—the failed negotiations of the past were caused by a lack of fear as a motivating factor. In every discussion and summit both sides viewed the possible collapsing of these negotiations with little more than a shrug, convinced that if given more time they could change realities on the ground and make negotiations more favorable. These negotiations, though, are surrounded by far more worrisome consequences should they fail.
After the successful Hamas coup in Gaza, Abbas’ Fatah party has found that its only viable strategy to isolate this rogue entity is to make a deal for peace with Israel. The Arab countries also have a great deal more motivation to see a peace deal happen. With the threat of Iran looming, the Sunni regimes of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt are anxious to see a compromise made on the Israel issue, which will then help them present a united front against Ahmadinejad’s extremist regime. Israel, too, is feeling pressure. With the takeover of Gaza by Hamas, many within Israel are worried that this militancy will spread to the West Bank, leading to all out-war with their Palestinian counterparts. The prospect of this catastrophic reality has led many to the conclusion that peace with the Palestinians must come as soon as humanly possible.
To say that this fear will enable Annapolis to herald the imminent conclusion of this long conflict is naïve. Fear cannot replace decades of bloodshed with friendship. But these negotiations, coming at a time of such fear, can help catalyze the process of solving this problem. By settling issues such as sovereignty of Jerusalem, Palestinian borders and right of return, these negotiations can move the attention of these two peoples away from their bloody history and to the project of creating a viable Palestinian state. The Annapolis summit, and the negotiations to follow, will pave the way towards an end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.