When I first heard about the Annapolis Middle East peace conference which took place last week, I was reminded of the Camp David summit of 2000, when peace seemed so close but didn’t materialize because of a combination of Yasser Arafat’s self-interest and Israeli political instability. The collapse of the 2000 summit led to the second Palestinian uprising, the al-Aqsa Intifada, a long and bitter clash between Palestinians and Israelis. The increased violence allowed the right wing in Israeli politics to gain strength, culminating in Ariel Sharon’s defeat of Prime Minister Ehud Barak in 2001, effectively ending the peace process that Barak had started. As a result of Palestinian suicide bombers and Israel’s increased military control over the West Bank, neither side was able to do what the other wanted in order to jump-start the peace process. Both failed to implement Phase I of the “road map” for peace proposed by the Bush administration, whereby Israel would withdraw from the West Bank and would freeze settlement expansion and the Palestinian Authority would stop terrorism against Israel.

This year peace is again in the air. The United States organized the Annapolis conference in an effort to forge a substantive document on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On Nov. 26 and 28, 2007, Bush met with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas at the White House. On Nov. 27, they met in Annapolis, MD, along with delegations from 46 countries and international organizations. The leaders had already been meeting repeatedly since June to try to agree on some basic issues of the conflict. With Arafat gone and the more moderate Abbas leading the Palestinians, it seemed both sides might be able to agree on something. But as the conference drew nearer, the problems associated with it became more pronounced. The conference came and went and an agreement was reached; nevertheless, because of the weaknesses of both leaders and the numerous protests by Palestinians and Israelis alike at possible concessions involved in peace deals, it has become clear that peace does not seem feasible in the near future.

Look at the joint statement agreed upon by Olmert and Abbas. It states that Israel and the Palestinians will “commit to immediately implement their respective obligations under the performance-based road map to a permanent two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.” They will “continue the implementation of the ongoing obligations of the [2003] road map until they reach a peace treaty.” Ideally, such an agreement would resolve the controversial questions of the fate of Jerusalem, Israeli settlements, Palestinian refugees and final borders for the Israeli and Palestinian states.

However, Israel and the Palestinians were not even able to satisfy Phase I of the road map back in 2003. Given the bitterness that has grown since then, it does not seem likely that either side will be able to do anything to satisfy the other. After six years of suicide attacks and rockets, the Israeli public has become much more opposed to any concessions to the Palestinians. Israelis were very divided over the Gaza disengagement in 2005. Now that the militant group Hamas has taken over Gaza and turned it into a rocket-launching base, Israelis are even more hesitant about pulling out of the West Bank. Additionally, due to the security fence and checkpoints that Israel has set up, successful terrorist attacks have dropped significantly, so fear will not force Israel to compromise; if anything, Israelis worry that withdrawing from the West Bank will allow terrorist groups to gain strength and attack Israel more easily.

Then there is the question of Olmert’s extremely shaky coalition government. In order to form a majority coalition, the prime minister has had to include the ultra-orthodox religious party Shas and the rightist party Yisrael Beiteinu. These parties have threatened to bolt the coalition if the idea of dividing Jerusalem or removing settlements is even put on the table. These threats are part of why Olmert did not discuss any specific compromises on these issues, but only accepted the abstract necessity “to usher in a new era of peace, based on freedom, security, justice, dignity, respect and mutual recognition.” The core issues were only indirectly related to as “outstanding issues, including all core issues without exception, as specified in previous agreements.”

In the event that Olmert does give any indication of a willingness to divide Jerusalem or to remove settlements, both parties will carry out their threats to leave the coalition. The remaining political parties in the current Israeli Knesset (Parliament) are right-wing ones that would not join the coalition and Arab ones that would not be accepted. The coalition would then fall apart and force new elections where the right wing parties would likely gain many seats. If a right wing party leads the coalition, there will be no compromise on Jerusalem and settlements, and no possible peace agreement in the near future.

On the Palestinian side, Abbas does not have the power to successfully follow through on the road map. After the Hamas takeover of Gaza, Abbas and his Fatah Party became the controlling government of the West Bank. There, he has been continuously trying without much success to squelch terrorism. Nevertheless, the Fatah-affiliated Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade continues to attempt terrorist attacks on Israel. Recently, Israel arrested three Palestinian Authority security personnel, on suspicion of killing an Israeli civilian in the northern West Bank. Additionally, according to Yuval Diskin, the director of Israel’s Shin Bet internal security agency, gunmen loyal to Abbas’ Fatah movement planned to attack Olmert’s convoy as it entered the West Bank town of Jericho on Aug. 6. Israel notified Palestinian authorities, who arrested an unspecified number of Fatah militants. Of course, they then release the suspects, even though they had admitted to the crime, according to Palestinian security sources. Also, while Israel continues to release Palestinian prisoners as a good faith gesture towards Abbas, these released prisoners often begin their violence anew, undermining both the Palestinian president and the peace process.

Clearly, Abbas does not control Fatah’s armed factions. And if members of his own security forces cannot be controlled, how can Israel expect Abbas to actually create stability in the West Bank? Attacks and attempted attacks like these show that these militant Palestinians will do anything to stop these peace agreements, and that they have no qualms about undermining Abbas’s already unstable government. Israelis fear that upon their withdrawal, Hamas could just as easily take over the West Bank as with Gaza.

Of course there are more moderate people on both sides who would agree to significant compromises in order to achieve peace. But they do not seem to have enough power to back their propositions. There are numerous issues that could cause impasse in the peace process, but the major ones are clear enough. Most Palestinians will only accept a deal that removes a the Israeli settlements and gives Palestinians a capital in some part of East Jerusalem. Most Israelis will only accept a deal that allows settlements to remain unharmed and leaves all of Jerusalem in Israel’s control.

Bush has also stated that he does not want to be another Clinton and impose terms on Israel; he only wants to facilitate the process. The possibility of peace seems bleak enough as is, but without America nudging both Olmert and Abbas to compromise, this process will most assuredly fail. Indeed, most of the Israeli and Palestinian public thinks the Annapolis conference was a failure. With so many barriers to overcome, I simply cannot foresee a peace agreement happening in the near future, especially not by Bush’s 2008 deadline.