Nobody denies that there is now a de facto state of war in the Gaza area. However, the violence did not begin last week. Rather, physical danger and constant uncertainty have been very real for Israelis living near Gaza since the summer, when Hamas took total control over the Strip. By late 2007, according to Israel Insider, Hamas had fired 6,311 rockets at the Israeli town of S’derot, the closest Israeli municipality to Gaza. Last week alone, according to The New York Times, over 200 missiles were launched at Israeli towns. More ominously, Hamas recently acquired Katyusha rockets and other longer-ranged missiles, according to the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz. This enables Hamas to pummel both S’derot and the much larger Israeli city of Ashkelon, which is further from Gaza. If unchecked, Hamas can and will make life unlivable for the Israeli residents in both of those towns, and other, smaller communities in the area.
Like any nation, Israel has a right to strike back at those who threaten her citizens. No country would sit idly by while an enemy bent on its destruction rained rockets on its towns. Who would question America’s right to respond if Mexican guerillas shot rockets at San Diego from Tijuana?
Israel does have a level of obligation to protect Palestinian civilians in the war zone. Sadly, according to Times and the Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem, 54 of the 116 Palestinians who died in the latest violence were civilians. This might suggest that Israel is not meeting that responsibility. But is this the case? Israel has focused its strikes on militants attempting to perform rocket attacks, and on the leadership of Hamas. Given Gaza’s thick population density, it would be impossible for the Israelis to wage any sort of effective campaign without causing accidental harm to passersby. Nonetheless, Israel has studiously attempted to avoid killing Palestinians en masse. If that were not the case, the death toll would be far higher. Yes, the deaths of Palestinian civilians are tragic and regrettable. However, there is a major moral difference between Israel’s air attacks on combatants, which happen to harm civilians, and Hamas’ rocket attacks aimed at the Israeli citizenry. Faced with an enemy that makes no distinctions between soldiers and noncombatants, Israel’s first responsibility is to the safety of its citizens. The IDF—like any army—can’t be expected to abandon this duty because of collateral harms inflicted on the enemy population.
Many complain that Israel’s response to Hamas’ terror has been “disproportionate.” However, swift and punishing retaliation is a necessary component of deterrence. In the Lebanon War of 2006, the proportionality critique was also in vogue, as Israel’s response to Hezbollah’s attacks was pilloried as brutal and foolish. The fact remains, though, that there have been almost no rocket attacks on northern Israel since the war, and a United Nations force is in place in southern Lebanon. Disproportionate force worked, at least to an extent. Moreover, in Gaza, it’s unclear what a proportionate response would entail, or what would be its limits. Perhaps it would be sufficiently restrained to encourage Hamas to continue attacks without fear of meaningful retaliation. If rocket attacks were rampant before the recent Israeli response, it’s unreasonable to contend that downgrading those operations, in search of a nebulous proportionality would deter Hamas from continuing or even expanding its operations. If ending the attacks is the immediate goal, Israel is justified in exploring the efficacy of increased force to achieve that security.
Finally, some argue that the rocket attacks on Israel’s civilians are the fault of the Israelis themselves, for attempting to undermine the elected Hamas Palestinian government and blockading Gaza. That Hamas’ election was legitimate is granted. However, just because Hamas was ratified democratically does not obligate Israel to deal with it. Hamas remains committed to the destruction of the Jewish State, and to bringing that demise about through violent means. It has categorically refused to recognize Israel’s permanence or abandon armed struggle as a strategy. That being the case, Israel has precious little to gain from negotiating with Hamas, other than temporary, uncertain respite from violence. Also, if Hamas has declared itself to be in a state of war with Israel, it is completely reasonable for the Israelis to utilize economic warfare to destabilize Hamas’ Gazan territory. Why should Israel continue to supply and trade with an entity bent on its removal from the map? And if Hamas responds, as it always has, with terror attacks on Israeli civilians, why does it have the right to expect no military response? Constant struggle with Israel is a key element of Hamas’ creed; they should not be surprised when the Israelis strike back.
The tragic element of all this is that the Palestinians of Gaza collectively pay the price. But who is to blame for the toll, the nation that acts in defense of its own civilians, or the terrorist group that uses abhorrent means to advance an uncompromising ideology? To end the suffering of its constituents, Hamas needs only to do what the PLO did in the early 1990s—recognize Israel, abandon armed struggle and offer to join Abbas and the Israelis in the peace process. If they do that, and Israel still won’t deal with them, Israel is at fault. Until then, the ball remains squarely in Hamas’ court.
NB: Erik Schulwolf's views do not represent those of the staff.