Israel captured the Golan at the end of the Six Day War of 1967, in an offensive operation that was not directly precipitated by Syrian activity in that conflict. That is not to say, however, that there was no justification for the assault, as the Syrian presence on the Heights had, for the first 20 years of Israel’s existence, posed a threat not merely to individual Israelis in the adjoining regions, but also to Israel’s long-term viability. Between 1948 and 1967, the Syrians sporadically made use of the Golan to fire artillery at Israeli farms in Galilee, making life dangerous for the Jewish residents of the area. They also made other attempts to undermine the Jewish state, such as a project to divert the headwaters of the Jordan River, in order to cut the water supply to Israel’s main water source, Lake Kinneret. Furthermore, at the time, Israel was constantly concerned with the prospect of having to fight two- and three-front wars against its Arab neighbors. In such circumstances, an all-out Syrian attack from the Golan would jeopardize the entire Galilee region. For these reasons, faced with pressure from residents of Galilee and a favorable military situation caused by the abject defeat of Syria’s Egyptian and Jordanian allies, the Israelis made the decision to attack the Heights, which they took with ease.
That was 41 years ago. Today, Israel still occupies the Golan, which is unique among the territories still held by Israel, insofar as it has an easily absorbable non-Jewish population. This has made settlement—still illegal under international law—a far easier and less noticeable phenomenon than in the West Bank. In 2005, according to Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, there were 16,500 Jewish Israelis living in the Golan, many in the town of Katzrin. The region is also home to over 20,000 Druze and Muslims. Some of these individuals have Israeli citizenship; others have chosen to remain Syrians with Israeli permanent residency. Overall, on entering the Golan from the Galilee, one sees very few of the hallmarks of occupation that would, for example, distinguish the West Bank from Israel proper.
Yet, the Golan is an occupied territory, and Israel is bound, under U.N. resolution 242, to return all or part of it to Syria by terms of a peace agreement between the two sides. Further, it is highly unreasonable to assume that Syria will settle for anything appreciably less than the full restitution of the territory, and a return to the lines of June 4, 1967. This will mean the loss of Israel’s strategic position atop the Heights and most likely the forced removal of Israeli citizens from their homes in the area. In return, Israel will have what is likely to be a cold peace with a despotic regime. The question, then, is whether an accord is worth the price.
Generally speaking, history has shown that Israel’s security is enhanced far more by formal peace with its neighbors than through the retention of a supposedly strategic buffer of land. After 1967, the additions of the Sinai, Gaza Strip, West Bank and Golan were believed to be inarguably beneficial to the protection of Israel from hostile Arabs. In 1973, however, despite (and because of) Israel’s control over the Sinai and Golan, Egypt and Syria launched an initially highly successful surprise attack on the Jewish state. While the Yom Kippur War eventually resulted in a tactical Israeli victory, it was strategically a reverse. When Israel ceded the entire Sinai to Egypt in return for peace, the benefits of removing the strongest Arab power from a possible anti-Israel military alliance were of far greater value to the existential safety of Israel than the gains that accrued from holding the Sinai. Similarly, most rational people would argue that the costs of current and past Israeli occupations in the demographic hellhole of the West Bank and the seething cauldron of Lebanon far outweigh the benefits of controlling these tracts of land for Israel’s security.
The return of the Golan to Syria will not, as some surely fear, encourage the nation’s leadership to use its recouped territorial position to entertain further military designs against Israel. Syria is well aware that its military is no match for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Syria also knows that Israel possesses nuclear weapons, and will not hesitate to use them if it finds itself in existential peril. Nor will Syria resume the campaign of terrorization of the Galilean populace and operations against Israeli strategic interests that marked its last occupancy of the Heights. Syria knows that if it attacks Israeli civilians, or tries to cut off Lake Kinneret’s water supply, Israel’s response will be to retake the Golan immediately.
In fact, Syria will have an incentive to rein in its terrorist allies in Hamas and Hezbollah, or else cut contacts with them. Meshal and Nasrallah will find that a Syria with an interest in keeping an agreement that has enabled it to regain its land will be a far less conducive terrorist base than one that believes that the only way to maintain pressure on Israel to give up the Golan is through its alliance with Muslim extremists who utilize asymmetric warfare. Beyond the ability to constantly keep Israel on edge, Syria gains very little substance from its alliance with Iran and the radicals.
A peace treaty with Israel that returns the Golan will remove most of the motivation to foment terror, and will replace it with an incentive to prevent attacks on Israel from its territory, as well as to rein in the groups in Lebanon that receive Syrian support. It will not be a situation analogous to the aftermath of unilateral Israeli withdrawals from southern Lebanon and Gaza, where Israeli departure from radicalized, unstable regions led to the ascension of aggressive and terroristic regimes. This would be a formal agreement, with a government capable of carrying out its terms. How many recent suicide bombings, shootings and rocket attacks in Israel, after all, have originated in Egypt and Jordan?
To be sure, there will be a human cost to withdrawing from the Golan. The Syrian government will certainly demand the evacuation of most, if not all, of the Heights’ Jewish residents. This will, of course, be traumatic for those who have settled in the Golan. Witnessing Israel’s withdrawal from another area that it claimed as a part of its territory will also be a sobering experience for much of the Israeli population. It is, however, a necessary one. Israel can only become truly secure in its borders when she and her neighbors mutually agree on the location of those lines, and recognize each other’s sovereignty within them. Gaining formal recognition of Israel’s borders from three out of the four neighboring states is well worth the cost of uprooting settlers, especially as Israel should not have allowed those settlers to move to the Golan in the first place. Furthermore, if Israel is ever to settle its more intractable conflict with the Palestinians, it must be prepared to evacuate upwards of 100,000 settlers from the West Bank. Israel must ignore the passionate protests of the residents, and steadfastly hold to the course that will result in internationally legitimate, and thus more sustainable borders.
According to the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz, a series of unofficial talks between Syrian and Israeli notables, carried on with the knowledge and acquiescence of both governments from 2004 through 2006, produced a draft agreement that should be broadly acceptable to both parties. Under the accord, Israel would withdraw to pre-1967 lines over a period of five to 15 years. In return, the border area would be demilitarized at a ratio of 1:4, in favor of the Israelis. Much of the Golan Heights would be a joint Syrian-Israeli park, administered by Syria, but with equal access for Israelis. Israel would get an early warning military installation on Mt. Hermon, and would retain control of the water in the Jordan River and Lake Kinneret.
If these indicate the terms of a future arrangement, they would aptly satisfy both the Syrian desire for the recovery of all of their lost land, and the Israeli concern for military and resource security. Indeed, a Golan park region that provided equal access to citizens of both nations would be helpful to speed the normalization of ties and the development of true bilateral cooperation. If Assad is indeed in earnest about a proposal along those lines, Israel must not hesitate to engage with him in serious negotiations, and work briskly towards a final agreement. It is time for Israel to slough off another of the damaging territorial millstones of the Greater Israel ideology, and realize that true long term security lies in the establishment of mutually delineated borders with her neighbors, not in the possession of a few extra dunams of land.