Olmert’s demise, however, became imminent in May 2008, when Morris Talansky, an American Jewish billionaire, confessed to giving the politician thousands of dollars in illegal campaign contributions in order to help with his business ventures in Israel. Olmert, in an attempt to once again give the political grim reaper the slip, vociferously denied Talansky’s allegations and demanded that he should not be held accountable until his attorneys had cross-examined the businessman. However, the Israeli public had had enough of its prime minister. On July 30, Olmert announced that he would step down in September, following a primary election in his ruling Kadima Party to determine his successor for the remainder of the government’s time in office.
This decision by Olmert to finally step down has created widespread uncertainty in the region. Before Olmert got into this latest spot of political bother, he had been attempting to negotiate a peace settlement with the Palestinians by year’s end, and was pursuing indirect talks with Syria in pursuit of formal negotiations and an eventual peace accord. These two political initiatives will become a little more tenuous with Olmert’s departure from the political scene, and the resulting period of political instability within Israel. Indeed, many fear that Olmert’s absence from the Prime Minister’s Office will completely destroy the progress made in these two peace processes, potentially leading to a third Palestinian intifada and a war with Syria.
In reality, the removal of Olmert and the resulting changes in the Israeli political order will be unlikely to cause such drastically negative consequences. Current polls show that Tzipi Livni, who serves currently as Foreign Minister and Chief Negotiator with the Palestinians, is leading the Kadima primaries by a significant margin. If she doesn’t make any major political mistakes before the election, she should settle comfortably into power and continue the Olmert government’s peace initiatives.
Indeed, the imminent end of Olmert’s tenure has created some concrete benefits for the peace process. Olmert, whose tenuous political situation created incentives to go slowly in negotiations with the Palestinians, now finds himself a lame duck with a legacy to secure. In the last few weeks, his government drafted a shelf agreement for Palestinian overview which would settle the territory and refugee issues. Though the Palestinians have rejected this agreement so far, believing that 93 percent of the West Bank comprises an insufficient territorial concession on Israel’s part, such a definitive offer is a good starting point for future negotiations.
Additionally, the rise of Livni will act as a further spur for these negotiations. Livni has announced plans to create a national unity coalition comprising of the leftist Labor Party and rightist Likud Party. If she is successful in doing so, such a coalition would lend great credibility to any agreement that is negotiated with the Palestinians, which would then have backing from the entirety of the Israeli political mainstream. The fact that the Israeli government will be led by someone who isn’t under investigation—indeed, Livni has a reputation for scrupulous honesty—would also be greatly helpful to the efficacy of negotiations, and their popularity within Israel. Many Palestinian and Syrian diplomats have been cautious so far in the negotiations since they figured that Olmert would possibly not be in office long enough to see any agreement through. With Livni in charge, they can have greater confidence in the longevity of the government. Simultaneously, general support among Israelis for negotiations with the Arabs will no longer be undercut by universal distaste for the man conducting the talks. Therefore, even as Olmert’s fall creates problematic uncertainty, Livni’s probable rise holds significant promise of a more effective peacemaking regime.