While the facts of the invasion remain murky, it seems that militiamen from the Russian-supported Georgian breakaway province of South Ossetia were engaging in a strategy of baiting Georgia through frequent violent attacks. In early August, Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili took the hook, sending his forces to assault the rebels’ capital of Tsinkvali, triggering Russia’s military response. Inference tells us that these provocations were likely the direct result of Kremlin planning. Russia had spent the previous few years giving Russian citizenship to the residents of South Ossetia, an egregious violation of Georgian sovereignty tailor-made to allow for a future Russian claim of Georgian attacks on its citizens. Further, it is inconceivable that the South Ossetian militias would have baited Georgia so brazenly without advance knowledge of Russian help, as their forces alone were no match for Georgia’s revamped military. Sadly, Saakashvili’s foolish military response to South Ossetia’s taunts gave Putin and his neo-imperialistic coterie in Moscow the opportunity to punish their troublesome southern neighbor.
Saakashvili has been an annoying thorn in Russia’s side for a few years. In a region that Russia considers its exclusive sphere of influence, he has aligned his country firmly with the West, especially the United States. A harsh critic of the autocratic Putin, Saakashvili has become, according to The New York Times, “a figure loathed by the Kremlin, on both personal and political terms,” a Hugo Chavez-esque character in Russian eyes. What Saakashvili, and by extension, Georgia, represents to Russia is the culmination of a process that began with the Velvet Revolutions and continued with NATO expansion in the 1990s, the encroachment of liberal, democratic, pro-American Europe to the very borders of Russia. Thus, even though Saakashvili’s actual credentials as a liberal democrat are somewhat suspect, his vocal independence is deeply troubling to Russia’s self-image as a great power. The Kremlin’s mailed fist approach to Georgia is designed to send a message to the countries in Russia’s “near abroad” that the years of Russian weakness are over, and that Russia is reasserting the regional hegemony that it deems its sovereign right.
The message has been sent to the U.S. and the West, too. Russia will use its might, both economic and military, to punish its neighbors who ally with NATO and Europe instead of with Russia. The Kremlin predicts, as Helene Cooper wrote in The New York Times, that “the U.S. needs Russia too much on big issues like Iran” to risk that cooperation in the interest of its friends on the very periphery of the Western alliance system. Behaving in accordance with that assessment, as the U.S. and Europe so far seem to be doing, would be a dangerous and cowardly step. It would damage Eastern European countries’ faith in the reliability of their Western orientation, jeopardizing the U.S.’s goal of ensuring that Europe remains a reliable bastion of liberal democracy. It would grievously damage American prestige abroad—permitting the gutting of a client state with little meaningful response is not the sort of behavior expected of a superpower. Finally, the U.S. should not be in the business of allowing nascent democracies to be bullied by larger neighbors. When Russia fires a shot across our bow, American global ends are not served by running down the colors and scampering away. Playing dead will only embolden the bear to future depredations.
In responding to Russia’s invasion, of primary importance should be rebuilding the confidence of Western-looking countries in Russia’s near abroad. The good news is that these nations show few signs of being cowed by Russia’s ham-handed treatment of Georgia. In the immediate aftermath of the Russian invasion, Poland agreed to host early warning sites for the American missile defense system. Ukraine said it wanted to do the same. Both Ukraine and Georgia remain committed to joining NATO. The U.S. should immediately insist on fast tracking them for admission. If NATO proves reluctant to meet Russia’s challenge in this way, the U.S. should independently sign mutual defense agreements with the two countries, stipulating that American support would only kick in the case of a completely unprovoked assault. Finally, the U.S. should offer to rebuild and retrain the Georgian military, and should commit to equipping those of Ukraine and the Baltic states.
The U.S. and its allies should also do what it can to discipline the Russians in the global community. This includes suspending many of the activities of the G-8, the club of powerful industrialized democracies of which Russia is a recent member, and elevating the G-7, the same club sans Russia. Simultaneously, the U.S. should refrain from participating in any joint military exercises with Russia for the foreseeable future, and should encourage its allies to do the same. This seems to be happening; the U.S. cancelled its planned naval exercises with the Russians, and NATO has scrapped plans for Russia to participate in the alliance’s upcoming naval maneuvers in the Black Sea. In the global economic sphere, Russia, like other rising economic powers, seeks greater integration into the global economic community, and a greater voice in making its rules. According to The New York Times, the Russians want “membership in the WTO … a new political and economic cooperation deal with the EU ... (and) a civilian nuclear cooperation deal with the U.S.” All of these ventures should be delayed. Russia must learn that a prerequisite of being welcomed as a 21st century great power is not behaving like a 19th century empire.
In the long-term, however, forcing Russia to act within the dictates of international diplomacy requires neutralizing the power that comes with its vast energy reserves. The fact that Russia is the primary fuel supplier for much of Europe gives Putin enormous ability to bully his neighbors. Europe’s North Sea oil reserves do not produce enough to dislodge Russia from this position of power; neither will whatever amount of oil we squeeze out of the Gulf Coast or Alaska. Russia’s newfound aggressiveness and willingness to use force therefore makes the pursuit of alternative energy sources an even more pressing security priority for the West. Only when nuclear power, wind energy, solar power and other renewable fuels meaningfully replace oil will states like Russia lose their ability to turn off the heat or make driving prohibitively expensive. Without what they see as a geopolitical get-out-of-jail-free card, Russia will be less inclined to flout international boundaries with impunity.
Managing this crisis properly requires walking a fine diplomatic line. Making Russia the enemy of the 21st century is not the answer. The point of the exercise is not to unalterably isolate and weaken Russia, but to incorporate it into a sustainable framework of international relations. Even as the West reevaluates its way of dealing with the Russians in the wake of this recent act of aggression, it must be ready to reward Russian cooperation on Iran and conciliatory Russian stances toward its neighbors with bolstered economic and political ties, and increased Russian involvement in multinational institutions and the global economic system. The U.S. must also use its leverage with Russia’s neighbors to encourage them to build constructive economic and security ties with Russia. Finally, the West should work with Russia and her neighbors to resolve the status of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria and other Russian-sponsored breakaway regions. Russia must know that, provided it behaves respectably, the U.S. will treat it with the type of respect worthy of a great power.
However, incorporating Russia into a stable global order will never succeed if its leadership thinks it can achieve its regional aims through naked aggression. Therefore, giving Putin a mere diplomatic slap on the wrist, as the administration so far seems inclined to do, is extremely counterproductive to achieving any sort of sustainable outcome. Resolving a spat with a bothersome neighbor with tanks and artillery is not acceptable behavior for a member of the community of nations, much less an aspiring global leader. When Saddam Hussein gobbled up tiny Kuwait in 1990, the world reacted with prudence and resolve. While the military option is plainly off the table here, whether the U.S. and its allies react with a similar mixture of toughness and pragmatism in response to Russia’s military adventure will go along way in determining whether the international politics of the 21st century prove any less terrible than those of the 20th.