Last week, Russia’s president, Dmitri Medvedev, signed treaties promising protection in case of attack with both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the two rogue territories that have been waging a war of secession against Georgia since 1991. The overt motive for signing these treaties was to prevent Georgia from rearming, an accusation that the Kremlin has made against the small Caucasus country on countless occasions. At a deeper level, the treaty exists so that Russia can more freely aid the enemy of their enemy, Georgia.
Medvedev’s concern with the territories’ self-determination is just as farcical as the sham election that put him in power. Only four days before the signing of the treaties, Georgia offered fresh evidence that Russia was playing a foul game. Phone calls intercepted from Moscow around Aug. 6 show that a Russian armed regiment crossed the Russian-South Ossetian border a day before Georgian troops ever attacked Tskinvali, the capital of the rebelling state. Russia’s already wounded credibility was not exactly helped by the fact that its only supporters in recognizing the breakaway republics are Nicaragua and Hamas. Furthermore, Russia has lost much of the economic muscle that allowed it to pursue unpopular political ends with such impunity. In recent weeks, the Russian stock market has become a disaster and investments have plummeted. Its chances of joining the World Trade Organization are now slim. By allying with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia only increases international scrutiny of its policies.
So why would soft-spoken, liberal-minded Medvedev decrease his own credibility as a leader by signing these disagreeable treaties? We can only attribute Medvedev’s inexplicable politics to the invisible puppeteer that still controls whatever the Kremlin decides—Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
Medvedev has always been surrounded by politicians who are far more radical than he, in addition to Putin. Though Medvedev, during his campaign, made the refreshing promise to loosen the current authoritarian regime when he became president, his administration has retained much of the climate of fear and xenophobia that existed under Putin, his predecessor. This includes often-hysterical government sponsored distrust of the United States, as well as regional democracies like Ukraine and Georgia that are considered to be American pawns. Putin (and now Putin-through-Medvedev) has always been steely in his determination to enforce Russian predominance in its region, and this will make it difficult for the rest of the world to pressure Moscow to sever its ties with South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
So far, the Bush Administration has said much and done little over the muddle in Eastern Europe, refraining from even minor punitive actions such as placing sanctions on the Russian government. This is understandable, as there are indeed consequences in forcing Russia to submit to international law. For one thing, the U.S. cannot pressure countries like Iran and North Korea to halt their nuclear programs without Russia’s cooperation. Additionally, Russia remains a big player on the international energy market, with the capacity to cause oil prices to rise precipitously. Undoubtedly, the Kremlin will use both types of leverage to avoid facing the consequences of its actions.
A risky but potentially necessary way to respond to Russia’s aggressive actions would be to create a NATO military unit that can be rapidly deployed into any country feeling threatened by possible invasion, in this case Georgia. Most U.S. officials are currently in favor of this policy. A program of military deterrence would also entail re-unifying all members of NATO and proceeding with the building of a missile defense system for Central Europe.
The wisest and safest first action to take would be to replace Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia and Abkhazia with U.N. and E.U. peacekeepers that exclude any military personnel from Georgia; that way, the Kremlin cannot continue to use the same excuse that they are defending peaceful territory from an aggressive Georgian military. If neutral actors provide the protection for South Ossetia and Abkhazia that Russia claims they so direly need, then the Kremlin will have nothing more to say.
And perhaps, when the world is more comfortable with taking drastic measures, the U.N. (with the help of U.S. votes) can affirm the territorial integrity of Georgia and reject Russia’s recognition of South Ossetian and Abkhazian independence. Once it builds up the courage to do so, the E.U. can transfer its entire aid budget from Russia to Georgia and suspend any negotiation on trade and investment between the E.U. and Russia. If it is too early to take these actions, and too risky, then the E.U.’s immediate priority should be to strategize with the U.S. and the Georgian government on how best to rebuild war-torn Georgia. However, all of these proactive measures may be well-worth the risk, especially when it comes to solving a problem as big as the conflict in the Caucasus.