The problems facing the prime minister to be, Tzipi Livni, are formidable. The two major members of the previous ruling coalition, Shas and Labor, are both asking for higher administrative posts than they had before. The leaders of these parties, in order to further blackmail Livni’s ruling Kadima into accepting their will, are spending a significant amount of time talking to Benjamin Netanyahu of the right-wing opposition Likud party. The central fear of Kadima is that Labor and Shas would leave the coalition, which would then force elections in which Netanyahu and the Likud would likely finish strongly. This means that Kadima has to make some tough decisions about whether it would rather lead a coalition in which its power was extremely limited or be the opposition in a Likud-run State of Israel.
Whether Kadima decides to maintain its tenuous hold on power, and whether Labor and Shas decide to risk elections, will have momentous consequences for the peace process. Before the resignation of Olmert, negotiations with the Palestinians had been moving along at a decent pace. Proposals on the total amount of land for the Palestinian state were being discussed, and the basic outlines of the sort of exchange that would satisfy both parties were being laid out. There was even preliminary discussion of how the refugee situation would be settled. Though these obviously weren’t tremendous strides towards a settlement, at least the parties were talking and reporting some kind of progress.
This has changed during the latest bit of political turmoil in Israel. Since the coalition talks are going so slowly, it has been difficult to keep negotiations going at a consistent pace. Additionally, the fear that a far right-wing regime might take over with a Netanyahu election win is leading the negotiating parties to rethink their strategies. The Palestinians, for instance, are starting to consider pushing for a one-state settlement instead of a two-state settlement. This would mean that they would seek the incorporation of the entirety of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip into Israel, which would eliminate the Jewish majority in Israel and destroy its Zionist spirit. In turn, the rightists in Israel are beginning to think that perhaps the time is ripe for more standoff. They hope to recoup much of their former power in a possible election, at which point they could hold out for more in negotiations with the Palestinians. If negotiations over Livni’s coalition continue to drag out, both of these possible scenarios could become reality, which would snuff out hopes for an Israeli-Palestinian accord in the near future. The Israelis would insist on continued possession of their settlements and the Palestinians would demand the destruction of the idea of Zionism. This situation would unavoidably be settled militarily.
However, a quick end to these tumultuous political negotiations in Israel could settle this dispute. If Labor and Shas play ball and Livni and Kadima are able to reassert power and go back to the negotiating table, a lasting peace agreement could be in the offing, as both Livni and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas are keen on pursuing an agreement without disruption. But, in the self-interested world of Israeli politics, no one should count on people doing what’s best for peace.