In the wake of purported U.S. weakness and ineptitude in dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue, many pundits have called for increased pressure beyond the threat of “crippling” economic sanctions. Claiming the lack of any viable alternative, they wish to press military action into the spectrum of options at the disposal of American policymakers. Yet it is imperative such pressure be avoided. Presenting military action as an alternative to diplomacy and engagement would not only fail to obtain the desired results in the short run but would, in fact, prove more damaging in the long run.

We must first and foremost consider the latent political opposition in Iran. An attack on the country would instantly destroy any sliver of hope for a revival as fierce Iranian nationalism would mobilize the center in favor of a government currently seen as illegitimate by many Iranians. Citizens naturally rally around their leadership in a time of national crises, and dissent is subsumed by consensus — too many historical analogies speak to this fact. Why should another highly nationalistic country react any differently to a challenge to what it perceives as its sovereign rights? Whether Ahmadinejad answers simply by shoring up domestic support for weaponization or escalates tensions by calling for military mobilization, any belligerent assertion of Iranian sovereignty would inevitably undermine our ability to strengthen the opposition and weaken the government’s hold on the reins of power.

Furthermore, an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities would place the country in a position to retaliate — if not directly, then certainly through proxies — further exacerbating sectarian and nationalist tensions and effectively derailing continued U.S. efforts at regional stabilization. Most likely to directly assault an already tense Israel, Iran could still use its influence over Hamas and Hezbollah to encourage a stepped up terror campaign consisting of rocket attacks and suicide bombers within Israeli borders. This, along with the additional capacity to undermine U.S. efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan would have dire consequences not only for the region but also for domestic support of the Obama administration. The indecisiveness on Afghanistan and increased estrangement from Israel have already worked to lower Obama’s popularity at home.

Finally, preventive action fails to stand on its merits from a military standpoint. Because full weaponization is still years away, a U.S. attack would only further delay efforts and would not put an end to enrichment and weaponization indefinitely. Additionally, our limited intelligence capabilities within the country cannot guarantee complete mission success — essentially leaving the fate of the mission purely to chance. Taking into account the fact that any attack would effectively terminate negotiations regardless of the military outcome, we must ask ourselves: are we willing to throw away the opportunity of a permanent, peaceful solution for what amounts to a mere possibility of delaying the reality of a nuclear Iran?

Thus, while the use of force as a means of achieving progress vis-a-vis Iran is alluring, it is clear that the costs of preventive military action far outweigh the benefits. Standing to completely undermine any progress made in the past few months, military action — successful or not — gives the Iranian government an excuse to shore up its power at home, increase regional instability, disengage from the U.S. and most importantly provides them with justification to continue on a path towards nuclear weaponization.

Though military action must not be presented as a viable policy option in light of these realities, this does not, as some would argue, constitute US weakness. For if Iran still proves unsusceptible to diplomacy and engagement, the U.S. can and should seek to gradually increase pressure on the regime and could do so multilaterally as other nations, recognizing Iranian intransigence and the dangers such behavior poses, would be more inclined to work with the U.S. towards a resolution. But as we have yet to reach such a point, we continue to work towards an agreement with the knowledge that effective diplomacy takes time. Therefore, we must be patient and resist the calls of over-zealous ideologues who wish to push their own misguided agendas against the best interests of the United States and the world.