Outlasting Vietnam by three years and matching its complexity, if not its loss of life, the War in Afghanistan today is at the forefront of the administration’s long list of foreign policy problems. The “deliberate haste” that has often characterized Obama’s decision-making process (not always with good effects) is in this case a welcome addition, as the President decides a lasting solution to an increasingly open-ended and intractable war. Issues like the tainted re-election of President Karzai and his corrupt and nepotistic government, along with greater concerns over costs at a time of soaring deficits, have strongly weighed on the President’s review of U.S. policy in Afghanistan. The policy options available to him are varied, but they share constraints left by the legacy of the War in Iraq and will likely include some increase of U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

A troop surge, the focus of media attention in recent weeks and the object of debate between the administration and key members of the military and diplomatic corps, looks poised to pass in one form or another. However, even after an increase of troops, the combined total of NATO, U.S. and Afghan forces adds up to just around 200,000 — in contrast to the 600,000 deployed at the height of the War in Iraq. Furthermore, just as in Iraq, a surge by itself will not be enough to permanently drive back the Taliban, whose ranks are continually replenished by unemployed or coerced youths, disaffected tribal members and religious ideologues.

Creating a successful policy in Afghanistan will require a political-military strategy that acknowledges the need for nation building at a deep level. Invoking the world itself causes many conservatives to cringe, even though the lack of a robust development strategy in the past eight years intensifies the need for one now. This is by no means a suggestion to create a modern cohesive Afghan state; the past elections have shown us just how far it is from even the most basic democratic principles. However, Iraq has demonstrated that an effective counter-insurgency strategy can win over the general population by convincing them they are better off with a government that provides basic security, and in the case of Afghanistan, basic goods.

For a new troop surge to succeed we must see a similar surge in strategies that encourage village governance and self-monitoring. A recent New York Times article touted the National Solidarity Program as one of the more successful development programs in the country. Operated by Afghanistan’s Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, the program has helped local people with small grants that help procure necessities, such as roads and clean water, and provide training for key jobs, such as health workers and teachers.

Present in the country’s 34 provinces, the program fosters a strong sense of ownership and transfers funds directly to communities. This has the added benefits of bypassing the endemic corruption of the central government and increasing self-reliance, both of which make the return of the Taliban less likely. The caveat for this model has been most successful in areas with very little Taliban presence, an environment difficult to replicate in most of the country. A troop increase could keep these areas under control and provide a basis of stability necessary for real development to take place.

Security is a prerequisite for the building of infrastructure in Afghanistan. No civil engineer, teacher or doctor will perform his job if he is constantly in danger. Moreover, building a school would not be beneficial if the Taliban were only to destroy it the next time they recapture the town. Community leaders will not cooperate with a central government and allied troops that have failed to protect them in the past. How to avoid this scenario is a key question for any new proposal in Afghanistan. Increasing the training and preparation of Afghan security forces, thereby shifting the burden to those who have more at stake, could help to reinforce security in the country. Such a shift would have the added benefit of securing more support from NATO allies, which, facing mounting domestic pressure, have manifested their interest in downsizing combat forces while increasing the number of military trainers and civilians that can help in the creation of infrastructure. This could also help offset the cost of new a plan of action.

The big question regarding a new plan will be how to deal with the government of Afghanistan. In light of the flimsy election and Karzai’s serious ties to drug lords, it seems that the government’s rampant corruption and widespread institutional weakness will undermine any new U.S. initiative. Perhaps the best way forward lies in working around the central government as much as possible, focusing instead on cooperation at the local and regional level. A decentralized approach could also guarantee a more efficient allocation of resources; money, engineers, health workers and trainers would be sent where they are most needed. This will have to be coupled with constant pressure on the Karzai government to reform and commit itself to better governance. Even with all of these measures, success in Afghanistan is far from assured.