After the contested presidential elections of June 2009, Western pundits signaled a fundamental shift in the power base of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Yet important as this shift was for Iranians at home, for an American administration who recently shed the combative and divisive rhetoric of the Bush era in favor of rapprochement and engagement with Iranian regime, such a shift also had important diplomatic repercussions. For if, in fact, power dynamics changed in Iran, then who now had it and what would this mean for American efforts at engagement?

Certainly it was not the Green Movement. What has been described as one Iranian studying in America as a mere “Facebook movement,” it lacks any ideological basis, practical organizational structure or established leadership. Equally unlikely was the clergy. After the elections, hordes of dissident clerical leaders came out of the woodwork to express their displeasure with the elections results, with Khameini, and even with the concept of velayat-e faqih itself. Yet their tradition of passivism and the diffuse nature of the clerical establishment ostensibly limited their influence. Until their ideas are actually appropriated by a legitimate political movement, their effects are negligible and largely symbolic in nature. Finally, those currently in government are also seen to be devoid of any real power after being completely delegitimized by the events of June 2009; Ahmadinejead has lost the will of the people and thus his right to rule just as Khameini is equally despised for sanctifying the election victory.

Without the people’s blessing, then, the government must turn to Iran’s only source of real “hard” power for its legitimacy: the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Described by analyst Frederic Wehry as a “socio-military-political-economic force,” the IRGC has its hand in every element of Iranian society from multi-billion dollar construction contracts to state-run media and telecommunications enterprises to elementary education programs. Originally intended as a military force separate from the traditional armed forces to protect the government from a military coup, they have ironically engaged in a slow or ‘rolling’ coup themselves, quietly establishing a presence in every major sector of Iranian society, poised to ensure their power and protect their interests by any means necessary. As such, the U.S. must seek to engage or target this group directly if any meaningful progress is to be made.

But the power of the IRGC presents a dilemma for U.S. policymakers as recent actions, including the stalling of nuclear negotiations, have proven that the IRGC see the acquisition of nuclear weapons as the most effective way of securing their power at home and deflecting external threats from abroad. With a military option essentially off the table, the reality may be that in the end the U.S. will be forced to live with a nuclear Iran. Yet such a reality may be more manageable than we think. The IRGC have shown to be progressively more pragmatic and practical in their use of power as they steadily accumulate more wealth and influence within the state. Indeed, they are not the suicidal zealots the West makes them out to be and they certainly do not pose the ‘existential threat’ that Israel and some in the U.S. declare them to be.

Therefore, if the West can tone down its rhetoric, which not only makes Tehran more insular and defensive (think Mossadegh in 1953) but increases fears and promotes unrealistic expectations at home, it may be able to save face and manage a nuclear Iran through sanctions and the pursuit of agreements in areas of mutual interest such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Obama has consistently shown that he is willing to make (what he perceives as) the right — if not the politically expedient — choice when it comes to foreign policy. The Iranian nuclear issue simply presents his administration with another prime opportunity to showcase American realism by limiting expectation, setting achievable goals and wielding American power accordingly.